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Abstract
We present Handel, a Byzantine fault tolerant aggre-
gation protocol that allows for the quick aggregation
of cryptographic signatures over a WAN. Handel has
logarithmic time and polylogarithmic network com-
plexity and needs minimal computing resources. We
implemented Handel as an open source Go library
with a flexible design to support any associative and
commutative aggregation function. We tested Han-
del with a BLS multi-signature scheme for BN256 on
2000 AWS instances running two nodes per instance
and located in 10 AWS regions. The 4000 signatures
are aggregated in less than 900 milliseconds with an
average per-node communication cost of 56KB.
1 Introduction
Many large scale decentralized systems need to ef-
ficiently establish agreement between thousands of
untrusted nodes in a network. For instance, the
blockchain protocols Algorand [19], Dfinity [25] and
Tendermint [7] exchange digital signatures on a com-
mon message.
A common practical solution is to employ commit-
tees. For example, Dfinity uses committees for ran-
dom number generation and block notarization, both
by means of threshold signatures. However, there are
issues with using committees in a Byzantine con-
text. One such problem is that of committee creation.
Members must be randomly selected, but if the ran-
domness can be manipulated, Byzantine nodes may
take control of future committees. In the adaptive ad-
versaries model [9], committee elections must be pri-
vate and unpredictable. In Dfinity, the randomness
and the IP addresses are public, making committee
members high profile targets for attackers. A second
problem arises from the fact that committees are far
more vulnerable than the network as a whole. In-
deed, the amount of resources needed to compromise
a committee is, by construction, orders of magnitude
lower than that needed to compromise the totality
of the network. Hence, we argue that enabling the
whole set of nodes enhances the security properties
of a decentralized system.
Handel is a building block to achieve agreement at
scale without committees. As with most Byzantine
fault tolerant systems, nodes digitally sign a message
to cast a vote. The proportion of signatures required
is decided by the application built on top of Handel.
When applied to the problem of signature aggrega-
tion, the outcome of a Handel execution is a constant-
size multi-signature that represents the set of signers’
individual signatures. Many practical multi-signature
schemes exist. In our evaluation, we used the BLS
multi-signature scheme [4, 5].
Aggregating at scale is a well known problem [24,
30, 33, 42]. Cappos et al. proposed San Fermı´n [10],
an efficient and scalable data aggregation protocol.
Its time and communication complexity scale loga-
rithmically with the number of nodes through a tree-
based communication overlay and a parallel aggrega-
tion mechanism. However, San Fermı´n is not Byzan-
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tine fault tolerant and relies heavily on timeouts: data
sent after a timeout is ignored. This works well in
permissioned environments with homogeneous net-
works, but is inadequate for fully decentralized sys-
tems: short timeouts and high network latency lead to
valid contributions being ignored, while long timeouts
slow the protocol down. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no Byzantine fault tolerant protocol compares
to San Fermı´n’s efficiency. Handel provides Byzan-
tine Fault Tolerance and Versatility (natively
handles heterogeneous network latencies and com-
puter capacities) while replicating the Speed (thou-
sands of contributions aggregated in seconds) and Ef-
ficiency (minimal CPU and network consumption)
of San Fermı´n.
We stress that Handel solves not only signature ag-
gregation at scale, but also generic data aggregation.
We will thus refrain from using the word signature
and switch to the more generic term contribution.
1.1 High level presentation of Handel
Handel borrows the binary tree-based overlay struc-
ture from San Fermı´n [10]. Thus, every node parti-
tions the set of its peers into pair-wise disjoint peer
sets labeled with a level (a nonnegative integer). Peer
sets grow exponentially in size with increasing levels,
providing the basis for logarithmic time complexity.
However, and contrary to San Fermı´n, all nodes may
eventually contact all other nodes, contributing to
Byzantine fault tolerance.
Rather than contact all peers at a given level si-
multaneously, nodes contact them one by one. This
happens periodically and on several levels in paral-
lel. All communication is one-way and consists of
sending levelwise relevant contributions. Nodes can
receive and send incomplete contributions. Verifica-
tion of incoming contributions is triaged: only the
most relevant contributions are verified, which lessens
CPU resource consumption. At each round of out-
going communication, nodes send their current best
aggregate contributions. Completed levels are com-
municated sooner and more aggressively resulting in
faster completion times. Handel uses peer ranking
plus a scoring and windowing mechanism to prior-
itize incoming contributions to defend against DoS
attacks.
1.2 Deployment scenarios
We describe several deployment scenarios for Handel.
The first scenario is the regular deployment of Handel
as described by the protocol where the IP addresses
of the signers are revealed, with some practical de-
fenses. The second scenario uses anonymity networks
such as Tor [15] to hide signers’ IP addresses. The
last scenario uses ring signatures [39] to securely and
anonymously map IP addresses to fresh public key
pairs, thereby not exposing the link between the IP
address of a signer and its long term signing key.
1.3 Implementation & evaluation
We implemented Handel as an open-source Go li-
brary [32]. It allows users to plug different signature
schemes or even other forms of aggregation besides
signature aggregation. We implemented extensions
to use Handel with BLS multi-signatures using the
BN256 curve [1, 13]. We ran large-scale tests and
evaluated Handel on 2000 AWS nano instances lo-
cated in 10 AWS regions and running two Handel
nodes per instance. Our results show that Handel
scales logarithmically with the number of nodes both
in communication and resource consumption. Handel
aggregates 4000 BN256 signatures with an average of
900ms completion time and an average of 56KBytes
network consumption.
1.4 Our contributions
Our contributions are the following: the Handel pro-
tocol, (section 3), a detailed analysis of this protocol
in our threat model (section 4.3), an open source im-
plementation (section 6) and evaluation results in a
large scale context (section 7).
2
2 Definitions, threat model,
goals
This section presents some terminology and con-
cepts; we describe the threat model and the design
goals Handel achieves.
2.1 Contributions
Handel’s purpose is to facilitate the aggregation of
pieces of data we call contributions. Formally, con-
sider a nonempty set C whose elements are called
contributions, a set Pub of public data, a ver-
ification function VerPub : C → {0, 1} that ver-
ifies contributions against public data, a (partial)
aggregation function Aggr : C × C 9 C that
performs aggregation of contributions and a weight
function w : C → N to compare contributions. A
contribution c ∈ C is valid against the public data
Pub if and only if VerPub(c) = 1. In practice, not
all pairs of contributions (c, c′) may be meaningfully
aggregated, hence we insist aggregation be a partial
function (i.e. defined on a subset of C × C). Define
a pair (c, c′) of contributions to be aggregatable if
(c, c′) is in the domain of the partial function Aggr ,
and an aggregate contribution to be a contribu-
tion in the image of Aggr . Contributions that aren’t
aggregate contributions are called individual con-
tributions. We shall assume that the (partial) aggre-
gation function satisfies both commutativity and as-
sociativity conditions. The weight function measures
how many individual contributions are contained in
a given contribution. We ask for unforgeability of
valid contributions, eg. that the only way to pro-
duce valid contributions be by aggregating distinct
valid individual contributions, and that two such ag-
gregate contributions be equal if and only if they are
assembled from the same individual contributions.
For concreteness, let us describe these components
in the case of BLS signature aggregation [5]. Suppose
there are N participants signing off on a message m.
We define C to be E×({0, 1}N \{[0, . . . , 0]}) where E
is the set of points of the elliptic curve used for signa-
tures. Thus, a contribution is a pair (σ, [1, . . . , N ])
where σ ∈ E is a point on the curve (an aggregate sig-
nature), and [1, . . . , N ] is an ordered list of bits (not
all zero). This ordered list of bits is used to to keep
track of whose signatures are (supposedly) included
in σ: participant i’s signature ought to be “accounted
for in σ” iff i = 1. The public data is an ordered list
Pub = [pk1, . . . , pkN ] of N public keys. The verifica-
tion function is defined on c = (σ, [1, . . . , N ]) by
VerPub(c) = IsOne
(
e(σ, g)−1 · e
(
H(m),
N∏
i=1
pkii
))
where e is the pairing is used in the BLS scheme (with
values in the multiplicative group F× of some finite
field), g ∈ E is the chosen generator used to construct
public keys from secret keys, and IsOne : F× → {0, 1}
is constant equal to 0 except for IsOne(1) = 1. Thus
a contribution is valid if and only if it is the product
of the individual signatures on m (hashed onto the
curve as H(m) ∈ E) of the public keys represented
in the bitset [1, . . . , N ].
The domain of the (partial) aggregation func-
tion Aggr consists of all pairs of contributions c =
(σ, [1, . . . , N ]) and c
′ = (σ′, [′1, . . . , 
′
N ]) whose bit-
sets are “disjoint” (i.e. for all i, i
′
i = 0), and we
set
Aggr(c, c′) = (σσ′, [1 + ′1, . . . , N + 
′
N ])
Aggregate contributions are precisely those contri-
butions whose bitset contains at least two nonzero
bits, while individual contributions are those contri-
butions whose bitset contains precisely one nonzero
bit. We define the weight of a contribution c =
(σ, [1, . . . , N ]) to be w(c) = 1+· · ·+N ∈ [1, N−1].
2.2 System model
We assume there are N participants in the sys-
tem. Each participant i carries a unique identifier
idi ∈ [0, N [. Moreover, we assume each participant
knows the identifier of all other nodes participating in
a given round of the protocol. Attackers may choose
their respective identifiers in advance.
Multi-signatures. In the context of multi-
signatures, each node has a private key ski and the
corresponding public key pki, and the public keys of
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the participants are known to the participants ahead
of time. We assume that m, the message to sign, is
known by all participants beforehand as well.
2.3 Threat model
Handel makes several assumptions about the partic-
ipants and the network:
• Network: We assume a partially synchronous net-
work as defined in [16] or [14]1: a fixed (but un-
known) bound on the network latency is assumed.
In this model, an attacker can read and delay any
message (up to a maximum delay) before it reaches
its destination [18].
• Authentication: We assume point-to-point au-
thenticated channels between each pair of partici-
pating nodes.
• Adversarial model: We assume a static frac-
tion of the participating nodes to be Byzantine.
Byzantine nodes may behave arbitrarily during
the execution of the protocol and may coordinate
amongst themselves. Byzantine nodes are bound
to polynomial-time computation, eg. cannot break
the cryptography primitives commonly used.
2.4 Goals
Handel aims to be a large scale aggregation protocol
that outputs an aggregate contribution including at
least a predefined threshold number T ≤ N of contri-
butions, T being no larger than the number of honest
nodes. Handel guarantees the following:
• Termination: Handel finishes with an aggregate
contribution including at least a configuration-
defined threshold number of individual contribu-
tions.
• Fairness: The final aggregate contributions even-
tually contain all honest contributions.
• Time efficiency: Handel’s completion time scales
logarithmically with the number of nodes.
• Resource efficiency: Handel’s CPU and band-
width consumption scale poly-logarithmically with
the number of nodes.
1 [14] uses the term semi-synchronous
Handel is not a consensus protocol and does not
guarantee uniformity of the results. Indeed, the ag-
gregation of T (different) contributions may result in
different valid aggregate contributions. Moreover, a
node running Handel can output multiple final ag-
gregate contributions, each of them containing more
individual contributions than the preceding aggrega-
tion. Handel leaves to the application the responsi-
bility of managing these different aggregate contri-
butions.
3 Handel protocol
This section introduces the techniques used by Han-
del, then details how Handel works. For those tech-
niques involving parameter values, we explain how we
came to choose those values.
3.1 Overview of the techniques
Handel combines multiple techniques to reach its
goals. To achieve speed, aggregation is parallelized
as nodes organize themselves in a binary tree: this
leads to a O(log(N)) time complexity. A binary tree
where nodes occupy all positions from root to leaves
(reflecting hierarchical relationships between nodes)
is not fault tolerant: failure of the root node is fa-
tal, failure of intermediate nodes can be very damag-
ing. Thus Handel, much like San Fermı´n, uses a tree
based overlay network where nodes are connected to
all other nodes. These connections are structured in
levels. At the first level, every node n has one level 1
peer n′. That relationship is symmetrical : n′ has n
as its level 1 peer. At the second level, each such pair
of nodes n, n′ has two peers m, m′, themselves being
level 1 peers. Again, this is symmetrical. These four
nodes n, n′, m, m′ have four peers at level 3 and so
forth.
Because nodes may be down or slow, all levels are
executed concurrently and nodes optimistically send
their current best aggregate contributions, even if
their previous level is incomplete. Nodes will often
receive multiple contributions for the same level, and
update their own aggregate contribution accordingly.
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This brings fail-silent fault tolerance, but floods the
network.
For this reason, nodes engage in periodic dissemi-
nation. They do not contact all their peers simulta-
neously, but rather one by one, periodically and in
parallel on all active levels. Nodes activate new levels
every 50ms.
In a Byzantine context, nodes may receive invalid
contributions. Contributions should be verified be-
fore they are aggregated. However, verification can
be costly (a few milliseconds [31] for BLS signatures).
Moreover, in heterogeneous environments (with some
nodes faster than others, and/or a wide range of
latencies), some nodes may receive more contribu-
tions than they can verify. Furthermore, since nodes
may receive multiple contributions from peers in a
given level set, some of these contributions may prove
redundant or outdated. The verification of contri-
butions must therefore be triaged. For this reason,
nodes score incoming contributions before verifying
them and prune redundant ones. This brings re-
source efficiency—redundant contributions are not
verified—and versatility—slow nodes need not verify
all contributions.
However, this creates an attack point: Byzantine
nodes could flood the network with high scoring, yet
invalid contributions, and thus waste the recipients’
CPU resources. In the worst case, honest nodes may
find themselves wasting most of their resources veri-
fying invalid contributions. Every Handel node thus
prioritizes contributions by means of a local ranking
of its peers with a variable window size. The ranking
and score determine the subset of received contribu-
tions to be evaluated: simply score the contributions
from nodes in the current window of ranked peers.
Window size is dynamic: when a verification fails, the
window size decreases; when a verification succeeds,
the window size increases.
We now describe some mechanisms pertaining to
messaging. Messages must include the sender’s indi-
vidual contribution alongside the relevant aggregate
one. This allows its peers to aggregate individual con-
tributions even if the aggregate contribution is not
aggregatable with its local aggregation contribution.
Next, when a node has a full aggregate contribution
of a level, it immediately sends it to multiple nodes
in the relevant peer set (fast path) instead of relying
on periodic dissemination. Complete aggregate con-
tributions are very valuable : if a node possesses one
for some level, it does not need to verify any of the
contributions from that (or lower) level(s).
3.2 Tree based overlay network
Handel organizes a node’s sequence of aggregation
steps using a binary tree. For instance, in figures 1
and 2, both n4 and n5 aggregate contributions c4 and
c5 at level 1, and n4, . . . , n7 aggregate c4, . . . , c7 at
level 2.
level 3
level 2
level 1
1
2 3
4 5 6 7
n0 n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6 n7
Cn50C
n5
1 C
n5
2C
n5
3
Figure 1: n5’s view of the network.
level 3
level 2
level 1
n0 n1 n2 n3
n6 n7
n4
n5
Figure 2: n5 communication organization.
Formally, every node i defines a partition Ci0 unionsq
Ci1unionsq· · ·unionsqCiL of the set of nodes in the network where
∀l ∈ [0 .. L], Cil = {nodes sharing a common prefix
of length L − l with node i} (and thus Ci0 = {i}).
We call Cil node i’s level l peer set. See figure 1
showing how node 5 partitions the set of nodes.
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3.3 Peer ranks and contribution selec-
tion
As we saw, Handel is designed under the assumption
that (1) nodes have limited resources and shouldn’t
have to verify all contributions (2) nodes may re-
ceive overlapping contributions (3) Byzantine nodes
can send erroneous contributions or valid but nearly
useless contributions, as a way to waste the node’s
resources and slow the aggregation. This is solved
by selecting the contributions to verify through peer
ranking and windowing.
We call Verification Priority (VP) the ranks
publicly given by a node to its peers. The VP function
is computable from public data –the node list and a
seed shared by all nodes–, and act as pseudo random
permutation VPi(j) = rand(N, seed; i, j) ∈ [0, N [ of
its last argument j, where seed is a seed value.
Nodes sort the received contributions by their
sender’s VP, and select the ones in the scoring win-
dow: if v denotes the highest VPi among i’s incom-
ing contributions, we only score contributions with
sender VP between v and v + windowSize.
The score of a level l contribution c is, if (c, Inil)
is aggregatable, the weight of the aggregate. Other-
wise, it is the weight of the contribution obtained by
aggregating c with all previously verified and aggre-
gatable individual level l contributions. The highest
scoring contribution gets verified first.
The result of the verification changes the window
size. The size is increased by a factor two on verifica-
tion success, decreased by a factor 4 on verification
failure.
Nodes take into account the VP when they send
their own contributions: inside a level, they send their
contributions to the nodes that give them the high-
est VP first. In other words, every node computes
its level l Contribution Prioritization Vector (CPV)
[VPs1(i), . . . ,VPs2l (i)] where the sj are its level l
peers, and contacts the level l peers that rank it high-
est first.
3.4 Node state
The internal state of a node i consists of, for every
level l
1. the current best aggregate contribution Inil,
2. the current best aggregate contribution Outil to
send out,
3. the list of as yet unverified contributions Incil,j re-
ceived from level l peers j
4. the start time StartT imel
5. the current window size window ,
6. the VPi and CPV vectors.
Ini0 is i’s individual contribution. For all l, Out
i
l =
Aggr(Ini0, In
i
1, . . . , In
i
l−1) is the aggregate of the lev-
elwise best received contributions up to level l−1. We
call Outil (resp. In
i
l), and level l by extension, com-
plete if it includes all contributions from all levels ≤ l
(resp. = l).
3.5 Messages in Handel
There is only one type of message in Handel which
contains the following data: the level l, the sender’s
ID i, an aggregate contribution Outil and the sender’s
individual contribution Ini0.
3.5.1 Sending contributions
There are two circumstances that trigger messages
to be sent: periodic dissemination and fast path.
Periodic dissemination is triggered after every elapsed
dissemination period (DP) (eg. 20 milliseconds).
A node will send a message to one node from each of
its active levels. A level l is active if Outl is complete
or if StartT imel has elapsed. The completion of a
level triggers the fast path mode in which a node
sends Outl to small number of peers (eg. 10) at this
level l.
3.5.2 Receiving contributions
When node i receives a message from node j at level
l, it includes j’s aggregate and individual contribu-
tions (Outjl and In
j
0 respectively) in its list of as-
of-yet unverified level l contributions. If this list al-
ready contains a contribution from j, it keeps the one
with greater weight. The contribution vector is thus
bounded in size. The node purges this list of any use-
less contributions, and continuously selects the best
one to verify, as described in section 3.3.
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3.5.3 Pruning contributions
Handel prunes (1) all contributions from nodes iden-
tified as Byzantine, eg. which previously sent an in-
valid contribution, (2) all contributions from levels
where Inl is complete, (3) all aggregate contributions
that cannot be aggregated with, and have a lower
score than Inil.
3.6 Parameter values
We explained in section 3.1 the rationale behind
Handel’s key mechanisms. This section explains the
parameter choices in light of associated tradeoffs. We
designed Handel to perform optimally in a large-scale
WAN and to require no further configuration regard-
less of node capacity and connectivity. To determine
the optimal values of these parameters, we ran multi-
ple simulations with various network configurations,
described in appendix A.
We chose a dissemination period (DP) of 20ms.
This is compatible with verification times in the mil-
liseconds (it leaves enough time to verify contribu-
tions between DPs) and typical latencies in a WAN
(≈100ms). Experimental results show this is a good
tradeoff between network bandwith and time to com-
pletion.
The number of messages sent in fast path is set
to 10. The tradeoff is between completion time band-
width consumption. Fast path is especially important
when most nodes are available, as only completed lev-
els can trigger it. Fast path incurs no extra cost if it
is never triggered.
Level l start time is set to (l−1)×50ms. Activat-
ing levels incrementally saves an important number
of messages when the threshold is reached quickly.
Compared to a deployment without this technique we
observed similar times to completion but 20% fewer
messages, see appendix A.1.
Windowing preserves the benefits of scoring
(verify only important contributions) while ranking
senders (which limits the effects of DoS attacks). It
is important that window size decrease quickly when
under attack, so that Handel can quickly return to
the best strategy of using only ranking. Similarly,
window size must grow quickly under normal con-
ditions, so that nodes exploit incoming contributions
to the fullest. Window size can expand and contract
exponentially. The expansion factor is 2, while the
contraction factor is 4. These value perform well
under multiple attack scenarios. We limit the max-
imum value at 128 to cap the time to return to a
window size of 1 if attacked.
4 Analysis
4.1 Complexity
Consider the case where there are no Byzantine
nodes. In this case:
Time complexity is O(log(N)), as there are
log(N) levels, as in [10].
Message complexity is O(polylog(N)) per node:
periodic dissemination accounts for less than
log(N) messages sent per period. With O(log(N))
DPs, O(log2(N)) messages are sent this way. Fast
path can be triggered once per level, and involves
sending a small fixed number of messages, and thus
adds O(log(N)) messages. Message complexity is
thus O(log2(N)).
CPU consumption is less than message complex-
ity: not all messages received get verified. In the
worst case, all received messages are verified and
CPU consumption is O(log2(N)).
With a large fraction of Byzantine nodes, time
complexity degenerates to O(N): after N periods,
every honest node will have contacted all other hon-
est nodes, as Byzantine nodes cannot prevent honest
nodes from sending their individual contributions.
With a small fraction of Byzantine nodes, time
complexity is O(log(N)), the worst they can do is
not participate. Indeed, Byzantine nodes can either
(1) refrain from participating, (2) send high-scoring
invalid contributions (this wastes the target’s CPU
cycles and prevents honest contributions from ever
being examined and aggregated), (3) send valid but
very small contributions (this prevents larger contri-
butions from honest nodes from being integrated) or
perform (4) a combination of the above. The raison
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d’eˆtre of the score function is to counteract attack
(3): nodes verify large contributions first. (2) causes
the window size to be reduced to 1, eg. a node will
evaluate all the contributions received. Because of the
ranking, Byzantine nodes cannot prevent valid con-
tributions from getting verified, hence the protocol
will progress. (4) reduces to (3): with window size re-
duced to 1, peer ranking applies with maximum force,
as nodes will only verify the contributions from their
top ranking peer. all of them will be verified anyway,
so (4) is equivalent to (3).
4.2 Versatility of Handel
4.2.1 Heterogeneous latencies
Handel can deal with networks with very hetero-
geneous latencies. To illustrate this, we consider the
following scenario : (1) 80% of the nodes, call them
fast nodes, have latency 5 times the dissemination pe-
riod (DP) (2) 20% of the nodes, call them slow nodes,
have latency 20 times the DP (3) all nodes have fast
CPUs and can verify all incoming signatures (4) the
gap between two consecutive StartT ime is twice the
DP (5) there are 12 levels, i.e. 4096 nodes.
For such a configuration, the protocol’s time com-
plexity remains O(log(N)). This is because fast nodes
are the main drivers of aggregation. Their progress is
initially independent of that of the slow nodes, which
are initially indistinguishable from fail-silent nodes.
However, once a slow node has sent its contribution to
a fast one, its contribution will become widely avail-
able among the fast nodes.
For slow nodes, the expected time τ to reach a fast
node is dictated mainly by latency. In our example
with 20% slow nodes and λ = 20DP, a slow node
will reach a fast one on average2 in 20.25DP ≈ λ. In
other words, the time for a fast node to get the final
aggregation is slow latency +fast latency ·O(log(N)).
As latency between slow nodes is much larger than
latency between fast nodes, slow nodes will rarely
contribute interesting new aggregates and mostly just
receive those calculated by fast nodes. Hence, the
2with ρ the ratio of fast nodes, and λ the latency we have
τ =
∑∞
k=0(λ+ k ·DP)ρ(1− ρ)k.
time for a slow node to receive the final aggregation
is 2 · slow latency + fast latency ·O(log(N)).
4.2.2 Heterogeneous CPU capacities
If all nodes have similar latencies, but very different
CPU power, the time complexity does not change: be-
cause of the scoring function, the weak nodes check
fewer contributions, but prioritize interesting (high-
scoring) contributions. As was the case for heteroge-
neous latencies, weak nodes’ individual contributions
are included very quickly by the fast nodes.
4.2.3 Heterogeneous clocks
There are two synchronization points in Handel: (1)
the dissemination period (DP), and (2) the time when
the protocol starts. DPs may vary from node to node,
a situation similar to that of heterogeneous network
latencies. Some nodes may start the protocol late.
This is similar to having a one-time latency spike at
the start. However, late nodes quickly catch up on
account of them immediately receiving weighty con-
tributions from the nodes that started early. Hetero-
geneous clocks thus have smaller impact than hetero-
geneous latencies.
4.3 Security analysis
This section provides a security analysis of Handel.
We prove that Handel is secure against Byzantine
actors by showing that all honest nodes eventually
output an aggregate contribution containing at least
a threshold of honest nodes’ contributions, and even-
tually all honest nodes’ contributions.
To prove Handel is secure, we want to prove prop-
erties similar to the ones of a consistent broadcast [8],
closely related to Handel. This analysis is tailored to
Handel’s usage in the context of multi-signatures that
are secure against existential forgery under known-
message attacks [21]. We argue that this is a realis-
tic assumption as Handel assumes a publicly known
message before the aggregation protocol starts. The
security analysis uses the network and threat model
described in section 2. We make the assumption that
the individual contributions received by a node are
8
stored until the end of the protocol. We say that an
honest node diffuses its individual contribution when
it is sent to all other nodes. We say that a node in-
cludes a contribution when it is included in its final
aggregate contribution. In order to stay consistent
with the notation in this paper, we use the honest
node notation instead of the correct node notation.
Lemma 1 (Validity). If an honest node diffuses its
individual contribution, then all other honest nodes
eventually include it.
Proof. Because of our network assumptions (par-
tial synchrony and bounded intentional delays, see
section 2.3), all honest nodes eventually receive (and
verify) any individual contribution that was diffused.
Since channels are authenticated, honest individual
contributions are valid and all other nodes eventu-
ally include them.
Lemma 2 (Integrity). Aggregate contributions as-
sembled by honest nodes include individual contribu-
tions at most once. Moreover, if some node i’s indi-
vidual contribution is accounted for in a valid contri-
bution, then i must have produced a valid contribution
at some point.
Proof. Both points readily follow from our unforge-
ability of valid contributions assumption, see sec-
tion 2.1.
These two properties together ensure that an hon-
est node’s contribution eventually gets included in all
other honest node’s final contribution exactly once,
thus proving fairness of Handel. Termination is im-
mediate considering network assumptions and the in-
clusion of individual contributions in all messages. Fi-
nally, as long as the threshold parameter is lower than
the number of honest nodes, the number of contribu-
tions in the final multi-signature eventually reaches
the threshold parameter.
5 Deployment scenarios
We expect Handel to be widely applicable. Its
strengths and weaknesses, however, aren’t uniform
across all deployment scenarios. We focus on the pri-
vacy and DoS protection provided by various Handel
deployments in the context of signature aggregation.
Handel forces signers to reveal their IP addresses so
they can receive Handel packets. In some cases, this
public mapping between public keys and IP addresses
is problematic as it leaves signers vulnerable to DoS
attacks and privacy breaches. For instance, in proof-
of-stake protocols, a signer may want to hide its IP
address if it is linked with the public key controlling
its staked crypto-currency funds. The first scenario
we consider is the vanilla deployment of Handel where
IP addresses are public. The second one explores us-
ing an anonymity network (such as Tor [15]) and its
synergies with Handel. Thirdly, we describe a deploy-
ment scenario where ring signatures provide signers
anonymity within the set of participants.
5.1 Vanilla deployment
In this deployment, every node is reachable from the
Internet. There is a public global directory contain-
ing the mapping between signers’ public keys and
their public addresses. This deployment scenario is
standard in distributed systems and, as such, well
understood. On the other hand, having signers’ IP
addresses be public exposes them to DoS attacks or
even full compromise. One can still put in place de-
fenses against this class of attacks. In order to defend
against a full compromise, a signer can put its signing
key in an external HSM module [11]. Regarding DoS
attacks, a single offline signer has little effect on the
outcome of Handel. To make a node appear offline, a
DoS attack must block all outgoing packets. But one
packet reaching one honest node is enough to ensure
that a node’s individual contribution be included in
a final aggregate contribution.
5.2 Anonymity network
Participants wishing to hide their public IP ad-
dress can use Tor [15] (alternatively I2P [26] or
Freenet [12]), to deploy hidden services and use the
service address instead of a public IP address. Im-
portantly, participants can be on different networks:
some can be on Tor while others can use their real IP
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address. In such a deployment, latencies are very het-
erogeneous: UDP messages typically reach their des-
tination within 100-200ms [38], while Tor messages
take upwards of 500ms [36]. We show in section 4.2.1
that with a minority (eg. 20%) of slow nodes the in-
crease on time to completion is limited to a single Tor
roundtrip time.
In this deployment, Anonymity guarantees are far
greater than in the vanilla deployment. In order to
DoS a signer, an attacker would have to either attack
the Tor network itself, or de-anonymize the signer.
While the latter is possible for state-level adversaries,
it is a nontrivial attack. Regarding the former, Tor
has implemented multiple DoS protections [27] and
the most effective DoS attack remains that against
the whole Tor network. Of course, the security guar-
antees offered by such a deployment are limited by
those of the underlying anonymous network. For ex-
ample, a passive global adversary can target Tor users
with traffic correlation attacks [29].
5.3 Anonymous signers
Anonymity can be achieved if participants are al-
lowed to sign messages using fresh secret/public key
pairs. By means of linkable ring signatures [34], in-
dividual public keys PKi from a set of public keys
PK = {PKi}i can create new “anonymous” public
keys AKi in such a way that any attempt to create
multiple AKi from a single public key PKi is appar-
ent.
Using anonymous public keys in Handel requires
a setup phase where every signer i produces a new
anonymous private / public key pair aki / AKi.
Setup phase. Every signer locally creates a new pri-
vate key aki and public key AKi. It then broadcasts
the message IP-addressi‖AKi with σi, a linkable ring
signature for the set of signers PK of this message. At
the end of the setup phase, the signers know the list of
IP addresses of the other nodes and their new anony-
mous public keys AKi. If an honest signer detects
two signatures from the same signer (through linka-
bility), the associated AKi is discarded from AK. Us-
ing traceable ring signatures [17], the owner of PKi
can even be identified and removed from the public
list of signers.
Handel then runs its course using this new set of
public keys AK, without the mapping between sign-
ing keys and IP addresses.
The anonymity protection offered by this proto-
col becomes stronger as more signers opt in, which
is fortunate considering Handel’s ability to scale. Im-
portantly, the setup phase only has to be done once
and can be used for multiple Handel rounds.
6 Implementation
We released a reference implementation of Han-
del as an open source Golang library [32] under the
Apache license. The library implements the proto-
col described in 3 in ∼3000 lines of code. It is able
to accommodate different aggregation schemes (BLS
with BN256, BN12-381, etc), network topologies (di-
rect communication, different branch factor, etc), and
network layers (UDP, QUIC, etc). We implemented
BLS aggregation [4, 5] on the BN256 [37] curve (opti-
mized implementation by Cloudflare [13]), with UDP
as the transport layer. Our implementation includes
several technical optimizations not mentioned in Sec-
tion 3. Specifically, in QUIC it is possible to know if
a sent message was received. Therefore, when using
QUIC, we do not send the same message twice to a
peer. As an alternative, nodes using raw UDP may
include a flag in their messages to signal they already
received a message, so nodes do not keep sending mes-
sages in the lower levels.
Isolated verification. Handel strives to minimize
the number of cores dedicated to scoring and contri-
bution verification. Since Handel is to be used along-
side an application, Handel’s CPU consumption must
neither impact nor hinder the application’s normal
functioning. Our implementation thus scores and ver-
ifies incoming contributions on a single CPU core.
Message format. Messages in the reference im-
plementation contain: the sender’s ID (a 32 bit inte-
ger), the level (a byte), an aggregate contribution (as
defined in section 2.1) and the signature of the sender
(i.e. its individual contribution). A BN256 signature
is 64 bytes. The bitset’s size depends on the level
(size = 2level−1) bits). For 4000 nodes, the bitset size
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can go up to 250 bytes. The maximum total message
size is thus about 400 bytes.
Wire protocol. We used the gob encoding
scheme [20] which adds a few extra bytes to mes-
sages.
7 Evaluation
This section contains a discussion of our test re-
sults for multi-signature aggregation using Handel.
Our focus is on Handel’s performance and comparing
it to other aggregation protocols. We observe loga-
rithmic completion times and resource consumption,
and the effect of different parameters on Handel’s per-
formance.
7.1 Experimental setup
Measurements. All Handel nodes log measure-
ments such as the total number of messages re-
ceived/sent, verifications performed, and other in-
ternal statistics. For each experiment, we computed
minima, maxima and averages of test data.
Network topology. We ran large scale experiments
of Handel on AWS EC2 instances. Our biggest tests
involved 2000 t2.nano instances, each with a 3.3Ghz
core. In most cases, we ran two Handel nodes per EC2
instance, sometimes incurring an over-subscription
effect. Therefore, we expect real-world deployments
on commodity hardware to exhibit even better per-
formance than the ones measured in our tests. In or-
der to simulate a real world deployment, and latency
variability in particular, we used AWS instances from
10 AWS regions located all over the world. Refer to
appendix B for the exact latency distribution between
regions.
7.2 Comparative baseline
We compared Handel against a “complete graph”
aggregation scenario. In the complete graph scenario,
nodes send their individual signatures to all other
Figure 3: Time comparison up to 4000 nodes with a
99% threshold
Figure 4: Outgoing Network comparison up to
4000 nodes with a 99% threshold
nodes. Since Handel eventually leads to this scenario
(see section 4.3) we wanted to compare both ap-
proaches. In both scenarios, completion means aggre-
gating 99% of all individual signatures. See figure 3
for a comparison of completion times and figure 4 for
a comparison of the outgoing network consumption.
We observe that, on average, Handel is able to ag-
gregate 4000 signatures in under a second. Futher-
more, Handel is both orders of magnitude faster and
more resource efficient than the complete graph ap-
proach. Finally, Handel’s logarithmic time complex-
ity is apparent from figure 3.
7.3 Robustness of Handel
In these experiments, we tested Handel’s resistance
to node failures. Figure 5 illustrates Handel’s ability
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to aggregate 51% of signatures from 4000 nodes at
various rates of node failure.
Figure 5: Various percentages of failing nodes over a
total of 4000 nodes for a 51% threshold
7.4 CPU consumption
This experiment was designed to test Handel’s CPU
consumption under heavy load. In Handel, signature
verification is the main CPU bottleneck. Figure 6
shows the {minimum,maximum,average} number of
signatures checked for different node counts. All
curves exhibit the expected logarithmic behaviour.
In particular, the minimum curve shows that some
nodes verified close to the least possible number of ag-
gregate signatures for 4000 nodes: around 30 ≈ 24 =
2 · log2(4000) (recall that every message contains two
signatures). The graph also shows that some nodes
verified far more signatures than that. High latencies
contribute to this discrepancy: some nodes may have
to wait longer to receive interesting contributions. In
the meantime, they will verify all other incoming sig-
natures, eventually even those that score poorly.
8 Related work
The growing need for scalable distributed data aggre-
gation systems has spawned a number of interesting
designs in the literature. These systems are primar-
ily designed for permissioned networks such as grid
networks or monitoring networks.
Figure 6: Number of signatures checked on a node up
to 4000 nodes with a 99% threshold
8.1 San Fermı´n
San Fermı´n [10] introduced the binomial swap forest
technique enabling O(log(N)) time complexity for its
aggregation protocol. Handel is based on this tech-
nique. San Fermı´n has two important limitations that
Handel overcomes.
Timeout sensitivity. San Fermı´n is defined in the
fail-silent model where a node can fail and stop re-
sponding. In San Fermı´n, failure to send one’s contri-
bution within a limited amount of time is interpreted
as node failure. Hence, timeouts are a key parameter
of the system: if the timeout is too short, nodes might
be evicted too early; long timeouts on the other hand
negatively impact time to completion.
Byzantine actors. San Fermı´n is vulnerable to
Byzantine attacks: an adversary can prevent a con-
tribution from being included by contacting high
level nodes early on. A byzantine node can thus har-
ness many honest messages while also reducing the
chances of its low level peers of ever being contacted
by higher level ones.
8.2 Gossip-based solutions
The systems from [24, 28, 30] are gossip-based solu-
tions that converge exponentially fast for simple ag-
gregation functions such as sum and average. How-
ever, these systems do not protect against Byzantine
behaviors.
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8.3 Tree-based solutions
Tree based constructions can help address scalabil-
ity. Astrolab [40] is the first system using hierarchy
zones mimicking the design of DNS zones. Systems
such as SDIMS [42], CONE [3], Willow [41] combine
hierarchy-based constructions with the design prin-
ciple underlying distributed hash table (DHT) sys-
tems. Li’s protocol [33] is natively compatible with
any DHT abstraction. However, individual nodes are
solely responsible for aggregating and forwarding con-
tributions from their respective subtrees; a single
node failure can thus severely impact the protocol.
Finally, Grumbach et al. [23] use a mechanism sim-
ilar to binomial swap forests with the native under-
lying trees of the Kademlia DHT [35]. In particular,
it is the first system tackling aggregation with some
Byzantine nodes. However, their scheme requires in-
teractions between multiple nodes in a subtree to val-
idate an aggregate contribution.
9 Conclusion
Multi-signature schemes have garnered a lot of atten-
tion lately, yet data aggregation frameworks at scale
have been examined only under the fail-silent model,
and no multi-signature aggregation frameworks have
been developed to withstand Byzantine scenarios. We
argue that this is because Byzantine nodes are able to
follow the protocol while providing invalid contribu-
tions. When applied to cryptographic schemes such as
BLS signatures, a Byzantine fault tolerant protocol
becomes useful. With the rise of proof of computation
schemes (zk-snarks [22], zk-starks [2]), we expect
fast Byzantine fault tolerant aggregation schemes to
become increasingly important, as these schemes can
guarantee the validity of the data to be aggregated.
Lastly, Handel improves on the simple fail-silent case
by not relying on timeouts and by supporting hetero-
geneous network and CPU capacities of the partici-
pating nodes.
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Appendices
A Simulations
We present here results from simulations we ran to
determine good parameters ahead of running the
large-scale tests from section 7. We used the Wittgen-
stein simulator [6] to run these simulations, with the
following configurations: (1) nodes are deployed ei-
ther on AWS datacenters, using the configuration we
presented in 7.1, or in 242 different cities for which
the latencies are known [38]. (2) Verification time is
4ms on a standard node, but nodes can be up to 3
times slower or up to 3 times faster. (3) Nodes can be
down: we looked at two different scenarios: 1% of the
nodes are down or 20% of nodes are down. (4) Nodes
can be on a Tor network (eg. have an extra latency of
1000ms round-trip). We measure the average time for
the honest nodes to reach a threshold of 99% of the
honest nodes. The numbers presented are averages of
5 runs.
A.1 Deployment in 242 cities
Figure 7: Start Time. Comparison of different start-
ing times for levels. A start time of x means that level
i starts at time i× x. The left y-axis shows the aver-
age number of messages received per node. The right
y-axis shows the average completion time of Handel.
Figure 8: Fast Path. Comparison of different values
for the fast path mechanism. A fast path of x means a
node simultaneously contacts x nodes when a level is
completed. The left y-axis shows the average number
of messages received per node. The right y-axis shows
the average completion time of Handel.
Figure 9: Dissemination period. Comparison of
different Dissemination periods. The left y-axis shows
the average number of messages received per node.
The right y-axis shows the average completion time
of Handel.
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A.2 AWS deployment
Figure 10: Period AWS. Comparison of different
period times. The left y-axis shows the average num-
ber of messages received per node. The right y-axis
shows the average completion time of Handel.
Figure 11: Start Time AWS. Comparison of dif-
ferent starting times for the levels. A start time of x
means that level i starts at time x ∗ i. The left y-axis
shows the average number of messages received per
node. The right y-axis shows the average completion
time of Handel.
Figure 12: Fast Path AWS. Comparison of different
values for the fast path mechanism. A fast path of x
means a node simultaneously contacts x node when a
level is completed. The left y-axis shows the average
number of messages received per node. The right y-
axis shows the average completion time of Handel.
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A.3 Deployment with Tor
Figure 13: Period AWS. Comparison of different
period times. The left y-axis shows the average num-
ber of messages received per node. The right y-axis
shows the average completion time of Handel.
Figure 14: Start Time AWS. Comparison of dif-
ferent starting times for the levels. A start time of x
means the level i starts at time x ∗ i. The left y-axis
shows the average number of messages received per
node. The right y-axis shows the average completion
time of Handel.
Figure 15: Fast Path AWS. Comparison of different
values for the fast path mechanism. A fast path of x
means a node simultaneously contacts x node when a
level is completed. The left y-axis shows the average
number of messages received per node. The right y-
axis shows the average completion time of Handel.
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A.4 Deployment with and 20% dead
nodes
Figure 16: Period AWS. Comparison of different
period times. The left y-axis shows the average num-
ber of messages received per node. The right y-axis
shows the average completion time of Handel.
Figure 17: Start Time AWS. Comparison of dif-
ferent starting times for the levels. A start time of x
means the level i starts at time x ∗ i. The left y-axis
shows the average number of messages received per
node. The right y-axis shows the average completion
time of Handel.
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B AWS Latencies
The following table shows the different latencies from
each of the 10 regions we used during our evaluation
of Handel. Regions span the entirety of the globe and
therefore give rise to variations of more than 250ms.
Latencies are assumed to be symmetrical.
Regions Virginia Mumbai Seoul Singapore Sydney Tokyo Canada Frankfurt Ireland London
Oregon 81 216 126 165 138 97 64 164 131 141
Virginia - 182 181 232 195 167 13 88 80 75
Mumbai - - 152 62 223 123 194 111 122 113
Seoul - - - 97 133 35 184 259 254 264
Singapore - - - - 169 69 218 162 174 171
Sydney - - - - - 105 210 282 269 271
Tokyo - - - - - - 156 235 222 234
Canada - - - - - - - 101 78 87
Frankfurt - - - - - - - - 24 13
Ireland - - - - - - - - - 12
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